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Objective
To provide a quick, in the moment analysis of the social and political aspects of
theCOVID-19 pandemic to preserve the possibly ephemeral aspects that might be
overlooked in future historical studies.
Methods.
Qualitative and a statistical analyses of real time information.
Results.
The clustering of former imperial powers as states suffering extreme initial impacts,
combined with a brief qualitative commentary on the domestic politics related to the
pandemic response, suggests that colonial imperialism has lingering domestic political
effects.
Conclusion.
The domestic political power bases that enabled colonial imperialism may be a
significant and previously unrecognized factor in politics both in the context of disaster
response and more broadly.
While it is always a challenge, and an intellectual risk, to analyze political and social
events as they occur, particularly when they are unfolding on a global scale, there are
several aspects of the 2020 COVID-19 pandemic that may well be difficult to
understand if only examined in hindsight. From the challenge that leaders faced in
securing reliable data and interpreting them in the moment when decisions had to be
made, all the way down to the emergence, growth, and sometimes deadly
consequences of snake-oil scams and conspiracy theories, there are countless, often
intangible, aspects of the pandemic that could be lost to the academic perspective as
“the fog of war” dissipates and the clarity of hind sight alters our perspectives.
Of all the ephemeral vagaries inherent in the experience of an extreme crisis, the
psychology of the moment is a particularly challenging element for the study of the
social and political facets of disaster risk reduction (DRR), crisis management, and
disaster response. By definition, a disaster is a catastrophic event that is beyond a
community’s ability to respond to, and that displacement into what might only be
described as communal help-lessness can defy even the most concerted and
determined analytical efforts. For example, the irrational local resistance to building
DRR elements into post disaster rebuilding efforts was a puzzle that persisted for nearly
half a century before an accidental observation led to a possible explanation. It was the
“in the heat of the moment” language used by the most passionate and vocal opponents
of the DRR efforts being included in the recovery from the 2011 Christchurch
earthquake that was the key. The wording indicated that the psychology of loss-framing
and the instincts behind prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky,1979) were a huge
factor. Building the way that loss-framing would lead a significant minority of individuals

to overvalue the previous status quo into an aggregated rational choice model then
offered an explanation for the phenomenon where affected communities resist including
even externally funded DRR efforts in the rebuilding process (Van Belle, 2015).
Those “in the moment” elements of crisis can also be ephemeral. They either do not
appear in post hoc recollections or people’s memories of those moments are reframed
or rationalized in ways that obscure or transform them. For example, a variation of
Coser’s social psychology of the group response to threats (Coser, 1956) is probably
the best ex-planation for why Hollywood’s obsession with the drama of panic and looting
is simply not found in the reality of a disaster (Van Belle, 2012). Many who have
personally experienced those first few hours after a catastrophe strikes can offer
anecdotes of unexpected combinations of people coming together in amazing ways to
act as a group, but it has so far proven impossible to find a way to measure and analyze
that group response outside of those real-time observations.
FIGURE 1
Total Deaths per Million and Total Cases per Million in Democratic States (Log Scale)

This brief analysis, and the discussion that follows, are offered as a way to engage the
context from within the moment of crisis, with the hope that it might help contextualize
future academic studies by providing a foundation for at least some degree of
comparison between post hoc and in vivo perspectives. The idea is to provide the social
science equivalent of the real-time modeling and analysis of epidemiological data that
many expect will provide a panacea for future study. The currently available data are a
mess, the analysis is simplistic, and the discussion is highly speculative, but we still

offer them as a representation of how theories, ideas, and our backgrounds in the social
and political aspects of disaster response and DRR enable our understanding of the
pandemic as it unfolds, on May 8, 2020.
The Extreme Impact of COVID-19 on Former Colonial Empires
No matter how you examine the currently available data, the first wave of the COVID-19
pandemic has had a disproportionately severe impact upon the states that were once
colonial imperial powers, with Japan as the only one showing anything close to a
median experience (see Figure 1).

Figure 11 charts reported deaths per Million population against confirmed cases per
Million for democracies (6 or higher in the 2015 Polity 2 data) on logarithmic scales as
of May 8, 2020. We use countries that built empires through the active colonization of
external territory, starting with Portugal in the 17th century, as our definition of colonial
empires. Sweden might be considered a borderline case. The use of democracies
rather than all states reflects what is the most appropriate set of cases for the
discussion. Using all states changes little. It adds Russia as an imperial power, but
Russia is right up among the colonial empires that have become democratic powers,
and it adds a significant number of additional data points in the lower left quadrant, but
what is visually apparent here is just as clear in that more cluttered chart of the data. A
chart with a logarithmic scale is offered here as an example because it best shows how
Japan lies right in the middle of the scatter of noncolonial democracies, but the pattern
shown here is clear regardless of how the data are charted.
Similarly, the relationship between a history of imperial colonialism and pandemic
impact thus far is clear in a simple OLS analysis (Table 1). As is the case with visually
charting the currently available data, the simple correlation is robust and substantial
regardless of whether all, or just democratic, states are examined. This confirms what is
apparent in charting the data, but theR2of 0.589 also quantifies just how much of the
variation is explained by this single factor. While clarifications and refinements of the
Data are from Roser et al. (2020); retrieved on May 8, 2020 from https://ourworldindata.org/coronavirus
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data are expected and other factors are undoubtedly going to be found to be statistically
significant, the odds are that a history of imperial colonialism, or some close proxy
measure, is going to be acritical element in understanding this first wave of the
pandemic.
Both the visualization and correlation confirm the qualitative impression created by the
real-time observation of the unfolding responses to the pandemic. From flirting with or
even attempting some variation of pursuing herd immunity through widespread
infection, to significant domestic resistance and defiance of measures employed to limit
or slow the infection, to the fact that it is actually difficult to imagine that the U.S. federal
government could have offered a more catastrophic response if it tried, most of these
former colonial powers are the states that many, even casual, observers would expect
to see as the most heavily impacted by the first wave of infection.
The question is why; and that is where the perspective of an analysis from within the
moment might offer potential insights valuable for those conducting post hoc analyses.
While a variety of explanations related to the lingering effects of colonial imperialism will
have to be explored, what is most striking for those working with DRR issues and
watching things unfold is what might best be referred to as the social psychology of
colonialism. It is both a dramatic and salient factor in this group of states and it is
apparent in all of the different ways that they seem to be struggling to respond to the
pandemic.
Economic Dehumanization as a Necessary Condition for Colonial Imperialism
One thing that seems apparent to a pair of scholars who both are deeply familiar with
the countries that have arguably offered the best (New Zealand) and the worst (the
United States) responses to the pandemic to date, is that there seems to be a profound
difference in what might be called the sociopsychological makeup of these two
countries. In the United States, the Republican Party has found significant and salient
political support for prioritizing wealth over human life. In stark contrast, in New Zealand
a similar call to risk, or indeed sacrifice, lives to quickly reopen the economy fell flat and
was ridiculed to such an extent that it immediately stoked speculation in the news media
that the leader of the largest conservative political party, the National Party, would be
ousted for even suggesting that path forward, and shortly after this article was written,
he was replaced.
More broadly, the fundamental philosophical premise of prioritizing lives over wealth has
resonated throughout New Zealand (Jamieson, 2020). Public approval for that approach
to the pandemic response, which has been clearly, repeatedly, and pointedly expressed by Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, has found support of over 90 percent in
polling. Voluntary public compliance with one of the most extreme lockdowns in the
world has been extremely high, and the extent of the peer-policing of the lockdown rules
has been notable, leading to a near elimination of lockdown defiance after only a few
days. Both support and compliance have remained so high that after six weeks of
lockdown, even mi-nor incidents of rule breaking are newsworthy. The contrast to the

United States, where the president openly encouraged heavily armed mobs to storm
state houses to demand the end of far less restrictive measures, could not have been
greater. Clearly, there is a significant, politically powerful, and highly motivated set of
powerbases in the United States that do not just prioritize the pursuit of wealth over
human life, they do so to an extreme. While it may not be as extreme in other former
colonial powers, something similar does seem to be at work even in Sweden, which can
only be considered a marginal case as a colonial imperial power.
The theoretical foundations of the literature examining mass dehumanization of the
opponent as a necessary condition for lethal international conflict (Hunt, 1997; Van
Belle,1997) suggests that there may have been a similar necessary condition related to
imperialism. We posit that a significant and empowered political base that prioritized
wealth over human life was a necessary condition for the domestic political embrace of
colonial imperialism. A secondary element of this would be a proclivity to embrace
casting groups as “the other” as a normal aspect of political discourse, further
discounting the value of their lives in relation to economic considerations.
Should it be the case that establishing a significant domestic political powerbase
prioritizing wealth over life is a necessary condition for colonial imperialism, it also
seems likely that once established, that powerbase would persist as a coherent political
force. In the process of adapting to the end of colonial empire, those who hold that
prioritization would be a potent powerbase in a democratic society and would not only
be part of the transition into postcolonial economic structures and relationships, but the
political and economic elites that benefit from their support would be motivated to
sustain them and that critical core philosophical orientation as a coherent group to be
exploited. In contrast, countries that were never colonizing powers would have offered
far less economic and political reward for those who hold that prioritization of wealth
over life and would have fewer or limited structures to empower them as a coherent
force in the political or economic arenas as the world moved past colonial imperialism.
What Might This Explain?
While the domestic politics of having a potent domestic political power base that
prioritizes wealth over life is posited as an explanation for why former colonial powers
have been impacted so heavily by the first wave of COVID-19, and why so many of
them seem to be examples of poor or troubled national responses to the pandemic,
there are other aspects of what we are seeing in the current situation that fit with that
dynamic.
Japan could be explained as an imperial outlier that has so far only seen a roughly
median impact of the outbreak because of its crushing defeat in WWII. The democratic
political structure that was imposed by the United States after the war effectively
removed that element as a significant aspect of its domestic politics. A similar
explanation could be offered for why Germany, while still suffering far more than the
norm, is toward the lower end of the former imperial powers. While the allies may have
tried to eliminate the wealth-over-life mindset of imperialism from Germany’s domestic

politics, Germany’s place in the Cold War, combined with the persistence of Nazi
idolizers around the world, may have sustained the way that mindset motivates just
enough individuals to create more difficulties than noncolonial democracies have faced.
The most powerful and economically successful of the colonial empires, the United
States and the United Kingdom, are also the examples of what most would qualitatively
argue are the worst responses, and the U.S. version of colonial imperialism, where most
of the processes fell under the rubric of manifest destiny and westward expansion
across the continent, might also explain why Brazil is an outlier among the noncolonial
powers. Brazil’s “conquest of the Amazon” is effectively an internal colonization of
indigenous lands within their internationally recognized borders, and would likely
produce a domestic powerbase similar to those that arose in countries that colonized
externally.
We can take that notion of a group prioritizing wealth over human life as a political
power base further and look at one obvious aspect of the situation in the United States.
If we consider the politics and economics of slavery in the U.S. South as the ultimate
manifestation of that prioritization, it should not be surprising that the armed mobs that
stormed statehouses demanding that efforts to limit the spread of the virus be halted, as
well as the protestors who did not resort to terrorism in their demand that lives be
sacrificed for the good of the economy, sported Confederate flags.
These causal explanations are obviously quite speculative. Just as obviously, there is a
great deal of room for disputing and debating the premise that establishing a significant
domestic political powerbase that values wealth over human life was a necessary
condition for colonial imperialism, or that it would persist as such a potent force in these
nations. However, we believe that the basic point—that this appears to be a significant
factor from within the crisis as it unfolds and develops—will prove valuable to those who
study theCOVID-19 pandemic as a historical event.
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